tests for a variety of conditions that can be effectively treated through early detection. 6 Beleno sued TDSHS when she learned the state was storing newborn blood samples (NBS) 7 "indefinitely" for research unrelated to the initial screening. 8 Beleno did not object to the initial screening. 9 What she found problematic was the potentially "indefinite" retention of her son's genetic material and the unknown and undisclosed uses of the NBS. 10 Two other recent lawsuits and a series of interviews demonstrate she is not alone in her concerns.
11 Beleno worried about the misuse of her son's genetic information, such as in future employment or insurance discrimination.
12
Beleno's experience is not unusual given that all fifty states operate newborn screening programs. 13 Proponents of the programs argue they are an important public health tool because they facilitate early detection of certain genetic diseases. For example, the major consequence of Phenylketonuria 6. See, e.g., KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 10 (relating the "numerous personal stories from parents whose children are able to lead normal, healthy lives because of early screening and treatment of various genetic conditions").
7. Throughout this Note "NBS" will be used to refer to the synonymous terms "newborn blood samples" and "newborn blood spots. 14. See, e.g., Rothwell et al., supra note 11, at 1305 (noting that "NBS is a core service for public health" and that testing "identif[ies] infants at high risk for particular conditions and would benefit from early treatment"); Michael S. Watson et al., Newborn Screening: Toward a Uniform Screening Panel and System, 8 GENETICS IN MED., May 2006, at 12S, 15S , available at https://www .acmg.net/resources/policies/NBS/NBS_Main_Report_00.pdf ("[N] ewborn (severe mental retardation) can be prevented through early detection and implementation of a low phenylalanine diet. 15 But Beleno, and others, primarily take issue with the unclear and undisclosed state policies regulating storage and use of NBS that remain after the initial screenings and follow-up tests are completed. 16 Parents and patient advocacy groups raise additional concerns, including: (1) the lack of informed consent required for residual NBS use in research; (2) privacy concerns; and (3) whether states have legitimate justifications to store and use residual NBS without parental consent. 17 The focus of this Note is on the state's role in residual NBS storage and use and whether its interest in promoting public health is compelling enough to overcome well-recognized parental rights to consent to their children's medical treatment and research participation. 18 This Note argues that the government's interest in and obligation to promote public health do not justify non-consensual use of NBS. Part I provides an overview of police power jurisprudence, existing state policies regulating residual NBS storage and use, and previous litigation disputing state policies and practices. Part II discusses the possible public health justifications for using residual NBS without parental consent and
The analysis draws on precedent discussing the scope of the state's right to infringe on individual liberties in the interest of public health. In this context, this Note evaluates whether those cases in which the state's interest has prevailed are sufficiently analogous to apply to the state's use of residual NBS without parental consent.
screening is a highly visible and important State-based public health program . . . .").
15. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 5. 16. See Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ ¶ 12-18; see also KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 4 (" [T] here is also little transparency regarding storage procedures or the use of the samples after they have been screened.") (emphasis added); Rothwell et al., supra note 11, at 1305 (noting that research projects conducted after the initial screening and without parental consent "raise[] several ethical and legal dilemmas").
17. For a discussion of the issues raised by screening, storage, and use of residual NBS, see KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 12-23.
18. See, e.g Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PE-DIATRICS 314, 317 (1995) ("[I] n most cases, physicians have an ethical (and legal) obligation to obtain parental permission to undertake[] recommended medical interventions.").
whether this is an appropriate and permissible mechanism to fulfill the government's obligation to promote public health. Part III concludes that the state's interest in promoting public health, although important, does not justify a blanket waiver of parental consent. Part III then proposes a policy that states can, and should, implement to increase transparency and ensure that parental rights and children's rights are respected while still promoting public health through medical research that aims to detect new conditions, develop new treatments, and eradicate disease.
I. GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND NBS LAWS AND RECENT LITIGATION
Part I proceeds in three parts. Part A addresses the tensions emerging from jurisprudence discussing state police powers, providing a descriptive account of the limitations on state police power. Part B briefly describes current state laws governing residual NBS retention and use. Part C then discusses recent litigation disputing residual NBS use in Minnesota and Texas.
A. PRECEDENT RECOGNIZING THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING AND PROMOTING PUBLIC HEALTH
According to the Institute of Medicine, public health is "what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy," a definition which "reinforces that collective entities (governments and communities) are responsible for healthy populations."
19 Because public health research and regulations aim to benefit the community as a whole, tensions ultimately arise between collective benefits and individual rights and interests. [P] ersons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State."); see also NYC C.L. A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2004 ) (noting the "well-recognized and far-reaching police power of the state over the health and welfare of its citizens").
24. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. 26. For example, many state quarantine laws require a state to have "clear and convincing evidence" that the infringements will achieve its goals and do so by using the "least restrictive means" possible to achieve these goals. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136 (2005) In 1898, the plaintiff, a French corporation, sent a ship to New Orleans with cargo and over 400 passengers. 29 Although there was no evidence of infected passengers, the ship was not allowed to unload her cargo or passengers upon arrival in New Orleans. 30 This was due to a recently adopted regulation giving the state board of health the authority to "prohibit the introduction into any infected portion of the State, persons acclimated, unacclimated, or said to be immune, when in its judgment the introduction of such persons would add to or increase the prevalence of the disease."
31 The regulation's goal was to reduce the number of infected individuals and prevent the spread of disease.
32 When the ship landed, New Orleans was under quarantine and thus the passengers were not allowed to disembark the ship.
33
In his opinion for the Court, Justice White referred to a state's historically recognized power to enact and enforce quarantine laws to protect its citizens' health and safety.
34 He concluded that laws intending to prevent, eradicate, or control the spread of communicable diseases do not violate the Constitution. 35 Importantly, however, Justice White noted that if a state uses its police power in a way that is "repugnant" to the Constitution, the Constitution "must prevail." In 1902, Cambridge, Massachusetts's board of health adopted a regulation requiring all city inhabitants to be vaccinated or revaccinated for smallpox because of the disease's in- 28. 186 U.S. 380 (1902) Id. at 387-88. 37. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) .
creased prevalence in the city. 38 The regulation was enacted under a state law giving the board of health the authority to require and enforce vaccination or revaccination when "necessary for the public health or safety."
39
The State filed criminal charges against Jacobson after he refused to comply with the vaccination requirement.
40 Jacobson alleged that the Massachusetts law violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 41 He was found guilty and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court. The main issue the Court addressed was whether a statute requiring a person to submit to vaccination was unconstitutional. 42 The Court upheld the mandate, concluding that based on the "principle of self-defense . . . a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members" and that the statute was a " ing illegal markets. 49 The required information included the prescribing physician's name, the dispensing pharmacy, the drug and dosage, and the patient's name, address, and age.
50
The information was then stored in a secure computer system managed by the State Department of Health. 51 Under the statute, it was a crime to publicly disclose information in these records. 52 Physicians and patients claimed the law violated their right to privacy, intruded upon the doctor-patient relationship, and was "needlessly broad."
53
The Court upheld the statute, concluding it was a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. 54 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan, like his predecessors, noted the power's limits and reserved the Court's right to intervene in the future: "The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology." 56 The law was passed in response to increasing scientific and medical evidence establishing a correlation between "environmental tobacco smoke" (ETS) (second-hand smoke) and severe health risks to nonsmokers. 57 In its analysis, the court emphasized the significant and widely recognized evidence of ETS's harms. 60 The court applied a rational basis test under which there need only be "some 'reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis'" to uphold a statute. 61 Relying heavily on the evidence of ETS's harms, the court concluded that the smoking ban's intended goal-to protect the public "from the well-documented harmful effects of ETS"-provided a sufficient rational basis to uphold the ban.
62
Ohio voters passed a similar law in 2006, the "Smoke Free Workplace Act," which prohibits smoking in "public places of employment." 63 A bar owned by Bartec Inc. failed to comply with the Act and was cited for numerous violations, prompting the Ohio Department of Health to file a complaint seeking injunctive relief to order compliance with the Act.
64 Bartec counterclaimed, alleging in part that the Act "exceed[ed] the limits of the state's police powers."
65
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed with Bartec, recognizing that property rights granted by the Ohio Constitution were not absolute and could be subjected "to a reasonable, nonarbitrary exercise of the police power . . . when exercised in the interest of public health, safety, morals, or welfare."
66 According to the court, a law is in the interest of public health and welfare if it is "reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . confer[s] upon the public a benefit commensurate with its burdens . . . ." 67 The court upheld the Act, concluding it was a proper use of the state's police power and was "neither unduly oppressive nor arbitrary in its restrictions."
68
Although far from exhaustive, these cases illustrate that across a broad set of law and public health controversies, courts recognize and affirm use of police powers to protect public health but also acknowledge the power must be limited to protect individual freedom. Because of the potential public health 60. Id. at 497. 61. Id. at 486 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) On the other end of the spectrum, North Dakota stores the samples indefinitely with no specific consent required, allows the samples to be used for "medical, psychological, or sociological research," and per- mits the state to "charge for access to specimens." 78 Even when parents are told that research may be conducted using NBS, the reasons given for the research are often broad (e.g., "research with a significant health benefit" 79 ) and provide little, if any, specific information to parents. Newborn screening information is "confidential" in only twenty-six states, but "confidentiality" does not necessarily require removal of identifying DNA information from the blood spots. 80 The idea of confidentiality is thus misleading because it is possible to trace NBS back to the specific infants they were obtained from.
81
Unclear and inexplicit state laws governing residual NBS storage and use have resulted in a lack of comprehensive and transparent policies, leaving parents and health-care providers ill-informed.
C. RECENT NBS LITIGATION
As a result, residual NBS have been the center of recent public debate and litigation.
Newborn screening practices bring to the fore legal and ethical tensions between the state and its citizenry. Researchers, physicians, and public health officials contend that residual NBS research promotes public health because it may lead to advancements in disease diagnosis and treatment that will benefit both the individual children from whom the samples were obtained and society as a whole. loss of great magnitude: "a superb database has been lost. This database could have continued to shed light on causes of congenital birth defects and potentially led to preventative measures saving thousands of infants and their families the distress these defects cause."
85 There is also concern that more detailed and time-consuming informed consent procedures will increase costs, making research prohibitively expensive.
86
On the other side are parents concerned about parental rights, privacy, and protection of their child's sensitive genetic information. 88 Beleno filed the lawsuit after learning her son's NBS were being stored at TAMU for research. 89 According to the complaint, the Defendants' policies and practices violated both the law and the standard protocol of obtaining informed consent prior to any study involving human subjects. case was dismissed with prejudice; thus no court judgment was rendered. 91 As part of the settlement, TDSHS agreed to destroy approximately 4.5-5 million samples taken and stored without parental consent between 2002 (when TDSHS began retaining NBS for research) and May 27, 2009. 92 Despite the settlement, the battle continued. In 2010, Jim Harrington, lawyer for the Beleno plaintiffs, learned that between 2003 and 2007 approximately 800 NBS were sent to the United States military to create a "national mitochondrial DNA database." 93 The database was never mentioned during the lawsuit, and Harrington claimed he was repeatedly assured that the NBS were used only for medical research and not law enforcement purposes. 94 A new class action lawsuit was filed, claiming that TDSHS "deceptively [and] 102 The statute provides that an individual's genetic information may only be collected with the individual's written informed consent, used for the purposes specified by the informed consent, used only for the length of time consented to, and cannot be disseminated to other parties without additional written informed consent.
103 According to the Plaintiffs, the state stored the NBS without parental consent and shared the samples with private entities and hospitals. Minnesota's policy was to retain residual NBS unless there was a specific request that the samples be destroyed. 105 As of December 31, 2008, more than 800,000 NBS were stored, dating back to 1997, and more than 50,000 NBS had been used in studies for purposes unrelated to the initial newborn screenings. 106 The majority of NBS research uses " tions and federal regulations governing human subject research.
109
The Plaintiffs filed a number of claims, including violation of the GPA. 110 The State argued it did not violate the GPA because (1) blood samples are not "genetic information" under the GPA; and (2) Minnesota's "newborn screening statutes 'expressly provide' that the Department of Health may use, store, and disseminate . . . genetic information without first obtaining written informed consent."
111 The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss 112 and the court of appeals affirmed.
113
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "genetic information" under the GPA "includes the actual blood samples as 'medical or biological' information." 114 Therefore NBS are protected by the GPA, which requires "written informed consent to collect, use, store, or disseminate those samples." (4) (2012) states that "[r]esearch, involving the collection or study of . . . specimens" is exempt from § 46 protections such as Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and informed consent "if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects." The regulations comprising § 46 embody many of the ethical principles and guidelines articulated in "The Belmont Report." See Belmont Report: Ethical Principals and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter The Belmont Report]. Similarly, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 excludes health information "that does not identify an individual and . . . there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify an individual." There are also exceptions to § 164.514, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) "Privacy Rule." Rothstein, supra note In response to the State's claim that the newborn screening statutes exempted it from the informed consent requirement, the court held that the statutes provide an exemption from the GPA requirements only for "testing the samples for . As a result of the court's decision, the Minnesota Department of Health was ordered to destroy all NBS after they are stored for seventy-one days. 118 The destruction includes all NBS collected on or after the Minnesota Supreme Court decision on November 16, 2011.
119
Bearder represents the first, but likely not the last, court decision limiting state use of residual NBS without informed parental consent. Because of the potential public health benefits of residual NBS research, state policies should be scrutinized to determine whether the policies are justified under a state's police powers or whether changes must be made to include an informed consent procedure.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH AND RESIDUAL NBS RESEARCH
Supreme Court jurisprudence discussing a state's interest in public health indicates that states may act to prevent or reduce the risk of harm to the public even if such protection requires infringing on individual rights, autonomy, and privacy.
120
The infringements involved in using NBS without parental consent, however, cannot be justified by the reasoning used in the previously discussed case law. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) ("There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. . . . Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of the principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others."). Justice Harlan noted that the Court had "more than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that 'persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.'" Id. cies at issue in precedent, arguing that there is a frequently ignored distinction between protection and promotion of public health and that in both circumstances the risks and benefits must be weighed. Part B then scrutinizes who actually benefits from the research, given the tenuous connections between residual NBS research and public health benefits discussed in Part A.
A 134. In Jacobson, the Court agreed with "most of the members of the medical profession" that the risk of harm from a vaccination is "generally . . . too small to be seriously weighed as against the benefits coming from . . . use of the preventive . . . ." 197 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
135. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the "mismatch" between promised and actual benefits of research using NBS). from inaccurate test results.
136
Yet even if the "harms" do occur, they are neither as clear nor as compelling as those at issue in the case law. And perhaps more importantly, there are less intrusive methods available to ensure an adequate supply of residual NBS for research, such as an opt-in informed consent procedure, which will be discussed below.
137
In addition to the protection-based argument, states are also interested in promoting societal health and well-being by using NBS to conduct research that aims to discover new diseases and develop new and improved therapies.
138 Arguments based on public health promotion rather than protection are even more problematic and lack a firm grounding in either statutory or case law previously discussed. 139 Researchers and the public health community tend to default to a public health promotion rationale despite the speculative nature of these claims. However, the inherent uncertainty in medical research limits the ability to promise or guarantee society-wide benefits. 140 In an era of impressive medical and scientific advancements and grand promises for miracle vaccines, treatments, and cures, 137. Even though these less-intrusive measures may be slightly more burdensome on the state, requiring parental consent "would arguably be less privacy invasive than conducting research without the parents' knowledge." KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11; see also infra Part III.A (proposing an informed consent procedure for residual NBS use).
138 is important to be cautious of allowing such speculative promises to justify intrusions on personal freedoms. Newborn screenings have been performed for over forty years 142 and residual NBS have been used in a variety of studies, 143 but there have been few, if any, major "breakthroughs," broadly felt public health benefits, or prevention of public health crises from research results.
144
A primary rationale for residual NBS research is to ensure the initial tests' accuracy and to prevent false positives and false negatives.
145 However, quality assurance and accuracy research have not yielded such benefits. For example, one study concluded that there has been little change in the tests' "positive predictive values" (PPV), which measure the probability that a patient with a positive test result actually has the indicated disorder. used to justify a blanket waiver of informed parental consent.
148
The lack of significant findings or developments from residual NBS research raises serious questions about whether the proposed benefits of such research outweigh the potential risks and harms to individual rights and personal privacy. Because of the tenuous connections between protecting and promoting public health and NBS research, arguments attempting to justify a blanket waiver of consent for residual NBS use must fail.
Residual NBS Retention and Research: The Risks Are Real
In addition to the lack of significant benefits from residual NBS research, there are also real and legitimate risks of harm, particularly invasions to privacy. Risk-benefit ratios play an important role in precedent cases recognizing legitimate restrictions on individual rights. 149 It is therefore appropriate to analyze whether the alleged public health benefits of residual NBS research outweigh the potential risks. Residual NBS are stored in "DNA databanks," and parents are concerned about potential genetic privacy violations 150 that can impact both the infant and his or her parents because certain genetic abnormalities of a child indicate the same abnormality in the parents. 150. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 16-17. 151. For example, if an infant has Huntington's disease, this indicates that at least one of his parents also has Huntington's because it is an autosomal dominant disorder. U.S. Nat'l Library of Med., Huntington Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (September 9, 2013) Cord Blood Registry, the largest stem cell bank in the world.
153
Some argue that these privacy concerns are unfounded because the samples can be de-identified before research use and thus do not require the additional protections typically afforded to human subjects research under the Common Rule.
154 These arguments, however, are unsatisfactory because although deidentified samples are not directly identifiable, they are not completely "anonymous," and research shows that de-identified samples can be linked back to the individual.
155 Despite assurances that genetic data is de-identified and confidential, "[s]cientists have been aware for years of the possibility that coded or 'anonymized' sequenced DNA may be more readily linked to an individual as genetic databases proliferate."
156 In one study, researchers were able to "accurately and robustly determine" whether a specific individual's DNA was present in a "complex genomic DNA mixture."
157
Given the misunderstood definitions of de-identification, arguments that the de-identification process eliminates the potential for privacy breaches and dissemination of personal biological and genetic information do not pass scientific muster. 155. Rothstein, supra note 107, at 3, 5-6. "Identifiability exists on a continuum" and is affected by the particular de-identification technique used. Id. 156. Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312 SCI. 370, 370 (2006) 323-24 (2013) (reporting results of a study in which researchers were able to determine the identities of fifty study participants from genetic information that had supposedly been de-identified).
158. See Rothstein, supra note 107, at 3. Researchers have been able to take "seemingly anonymous DNA database entries . . . and specifically identify the persons who are the subjects of the information even though the DNA in- The ambiguity of the term "de-identification" was noted by the Plaintiffs in Bearder, who stated that "it is not so clear what [the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH)] means when they say that the blood samples and test data are 'deidentified. '" 159 In response to the Plaintiffs' request for documents detailing MDH's de-identification procedure, the Defendants replied that "[n]o documents exist showing MDH processes of de-identification and reidentification," indicating that there is no established de-identification procedure and that the process and standards "vary from project to project and are subject to subjective standards." 160 Given that it is possible to re-identify de-identified samples, the Common Rule protections-including informed consent 161 -should apply to residual NBS because the Rule only exempts information that "cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects."
162
It is important to recognize that the potential privacy harms are both tangible and intangible. Many are primarily concerned about employment and/or insurance discrimination, but for others the mere fact that one's privacy has been violated is viewed as "an intrinsic harm separate from discrimination."
163 Given the uncertain benefits and the real and legitimate risks of harm, informed consent and transparency are even more important because of the inherent value many place on their right to privacy and their desire to control what happens to their infant's residual NBS. 164 formation is still questionable and raises issues regarding the inherent harms of disregarding autonomy, individual rights, and privacy rights. Analysis of the issue if complete de-identification were possible, however, is beyond the scope of this particular paper. want to be asked and informed first. 165 As one parent succinctly stated: "I want to have the choice." If residual NBS research is beneficial, it must be determined who will actually benefit and whether the benefits and burdens are fairly distributed.
167 Scientific research using biological and genetic information from any source can benefit society as a whole, 168 but speculative promises are inadequate to justify nonconsensual use of a person's genetic material. 169 If new diseases are discovered or new treatments developed through NBS research there is no guarantee that the majority of the public will benefit. The unclear distribution of benefits contrasts to the actual, broadly felt public health benefits of policies such as smoking bans 170 and mandatory vaccinations, 171 which can-and do-benefit the greater public. It is likely that residual NBS research is, at least in part, facilitated by private financial interest.
172
We no longer live in the era of Jonas Salk, who, when asked who owned the patent to his newly developed polio vaccine, responded, "Well, the people, I would say. There is no pa-165. "What's important is just giving people a choice. I don't like not having a choice and that's what bothers me." Id.
166. Id. 167. The Belmont Report obligates the just allocation of benefits and burdens in human subject research. The Belmont Report, supra note 109.
168. See, e.g., REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 2 (2010) (discussing the use of Lacks' cells to facilitate "some of the most important advances in medicine: the polio vaccine, chemotherapy, cloning, gene mapping, in vitro fertilization").
169. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11 (suggesting that "the 'public health benefits' cited by . . . public health officials and patients' groups may not live up to their promise").
170. Smoking Bans in Bars, supra note 133 ("Bans on smoking in bars and restaurants . . . reduce tobacco-related illnesses . . . .").
171. See, e.g., Community Immunity, supra note 128 (explaining the concept of herd immunity).
172. "Part of the issue is that some parents are concerned that the state or private companies could profit from the use of their children's blood samples." News Release, Johns Hopkins, supra note 71 (quoting Michelle Lewis) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Aaronson, supra note 91 (quoting attorney Jim Harrington, who, in response to the possibility that the Texas Department of State Health Services sold and/or traded NBS to commercial entities, stated that "[i]t's one thing to opt in to a research program that's nonprofit; it's another thing to have your DNA or your kid's DNA used by a company to make millions of millions of dollars").
tent. Could you patent the sun?" 173 Salk's response suggests that benefitting "the public as a whole" must at times take precedence over innovators' rights.
174 But times have changed, and today a major driver of innovation-particularly in medicine-is profit potential, 175 and both states and researchers profit from residual NBS research.
176 Profitability and promoting health and well-being do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. When courts have recognized justifiable restrictions on individual rights for public health purposes, the primary reasons for the restrictions have been to protect the public from imminent 177 or well-evidenced long-term harms. 178 Unlike NBS research, neither the state nor private entities had secondary, profit-driven motives in precedent case law.
179
The potential for profit incentives to play a role in NBS research raises questions about whether the promised benefits (new discoveries, treatments, etc.) will be available to "the public." Providing broad public access to screenings and treatments to promote public health is generally not a highly profitable enterprise, Moore v. Regents of the University of California is another example of issues arising from profit-driven medical research. The case involved a doctor using a patient's tissues without consent for research resulting in a patent that had a predicted profit potential of $3 billion. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 174 (Cal. 1990) .
176. See Aaronson, supra note 91 (discussing the Texas Department of State Health Services' trade of NBS for expensive lab supplies). 177. A highly contagious disease would be considered an imminent harm. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) ; Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 381 (1902 ). 178. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1977 (upholding a law meant to prevent misuse of dangerous drugs); NYC C.L. A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (noting "mounting scientific evidence" linking ETS "to serious health risks to non-smokers"); Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898, 904-05 (Ohio 2012) , reconsideration denied, 971 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 2012) (" [S] tudies have conclusively shown that exposure to secondhand smoke . . . causes illness and disease . . . .").
179. On the contrary, many business owners feared smoking bans would decrease their profits. See Wymsylo, 970 N.E.2d at 915 (rejecting appellants' claim regarding a decline in gross sales).
180. For example, pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to produce the flu-shot or other low-cost and therefore lower-profit vaccines, preferring to invest in high-cost drug development. The highest grossing vaccine has yearly sales of about $1 billion, whereas a drug for diabetes can have annual our health care system has become increasingly commercialized. 181 States and researchers assure the public that NBS research will result in beneficial medical advancements, but they do not further promise that these benefits will actually be available to society as a whole. For example, if an effective treatment was developed for a particular disease using NBS, would states subsidize this treatment to make it affordable, or would it be prohibitively expensive, preventing many from reaping the benefits of NBS research? It seems unlikely states will-or even can-make such promises. Thus it may be naïve to assume NBS research will provide the broad "public" benefits that have been promised, given today's profit-driven climate. 182 And although a public health benefit need not be universally experienced by every individual, the ability to benefit should not be dependent on ability to pay.
183
Justifying privacy infringements as serious as those involving an individual's genetic information based on a public health promotion argument could justify far too many other infringements and make it difficult to draw lines in the future. 622, 622 (2005) (noting that pharmaceutical companies are driven by profits because they are "businesses, not public health agencies").
182. It could be argued that curing a previously incurable disease, no matter how small the affected population, justifies nonconsensual NBS research. However, it would be inappropriate to use the state's police powers to justify such intrusion on individual rights and autonomy. Although we may wish that the state would do so, it has no obligation to eradicate all potential or existing diseases. In a public health context, police powers are invoked when necessary to protect the broader public, which by definition requires a benefit to more than just a small number of individuals. Indeed, "a principal aim of public health is to achieve the greatest health benefits for the greatest number of people." PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 14 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 2d ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
183. The very nature of a public health system is to ensure that persons in need are not denied care based on ability to pay. See, e.g research, perhaps they could also justify mandatory organ procurement from all deceased citizens-with or without consent. There is much stronger evidence of the benefits from organ donation than from residual NBS research; organ donations canand do-save lives, 184 which contrasts with the mere assumptions that NBS research will lead to beneficial discoveries and developments.
185 Using similar justifications, states could attempt to mandate all types of research participation, such as clinical trials for new drugs that could, if approved, benefit the public health.
186
The value American society places on autonomy, personal privacy, and the right to control one's own body requires the conclusion that the potential benefits of residual NBS research do not outweigh its possible tangible 187 and intangible harms. The state's interest in promoting public health is neither an adequate nor compelling enough justification to allow a blanket waiver of informed parental consent. This conclusion does not, however, require states to end residual NBS use altogether. Instead, states must develop and implement informed consent policies and increase the transparency of their residual NBS policies. Part III proposes possible mechanisms for implementing and improving an informed consent process.
185. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 186. These justifications could also extend to contexts outside of public health. Justifying infringements on the individual rights of a vast majority of the population (i.e., all newborn infants and their parents) to benefit very few individuals could permit the state to justify almost any action, as long as it protects/benefits even just one individual. For example, would we want the state to justify mass unwarranted searches and seizures of homes based on the premise that 1 in 500 will turn up an illegal activity (if we assume catching criminals is in the public's interest)? Although this analogy is not exact, it accurately exposes the risks and benefits behind the "common good" argument.
187. "Tangible harms" refer to risks of privacy/confidentiality breaches and the harms that could result if a biobank security system were breached and resulted in dissemination of a person's genetic information.
188. "Intangible harms" is used to refer to the inherent disrespect felt by individuals who were not given the opportunity to consent to the state's use of their child's genetic information.
III. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ADEQUATE INFORMED CONSENT POLICIES FOR THE RETENTION AND USE OF RESIDUAL NBS
Good intentions and speculative benefits do not give a state an absolute and un-tempered power to intrude on individual rights. 189 When restricting individual liberties, a state should have "clear and convincing evidence" 190 that the infringements will achieve its goal(s) and should use the "least restrictive means" possible to achieve these goals. 191 New parents are, in many ways, a captive audience. New parents may feel overwhelmed after their child's birth,
In the context of residual NBS storage and use, states have failed on both accounts, most importantly the least restrictive means requirement. Research to advance medical knowledge and develop new treatments is important, but it need not be achieved through the surreptitious attainment of genetic material. 192 but there are still many opportunities to discuss what they want to do with their child's residual NBS. 193 that states should consider when developing and implementing policies governing informed consent for residual NBS use. Parts B and C discuss different times when informed consent may be sought. States and public health researchers may resist such policy changes, claiming they are too burdensome to implement. States can certainly choose to maintain their current policies (or lack thereof), but given the recent litigation in Texas and Minnesota and the increasing publicity of state storage and use of residual NBS and other genetic material, failing to make changes increases the likelihood of future litigation.
A. THE INADEQUACIES OF AN OPT-OUT MODEL AND THE NEED FOR AN OPT-IN PROFESSIONAL "REQUESTOR" POLICY
States should implement "opt-in" rather than "opt-out" programs because opt-in policies promote information-sharing and provide a better opportunity for parents to make informed decisions.
194 An opt-out system relies on presumed consentthat parents agree to the storage and use of their child's residual NBS unless they explicitly refuse. 195 A potential problem with opt-out systems is that they "require[] that health care providers give parents more information than they currently do"
196 about the initial screening and the residual storage and use of NBS. 197 Therefore, an opt-out system "is not a true model of consent because it does not require any form of consent; instead . . . [it] functions as a substitute for consent." 198 idence that many parents are ill-informed about residual storage and use policies. 199 An "opt-in" consent procedure is preferable because it requires parents to provide "affirmative consent" to allow residual NBS storage and use. 200 An opt-in policy requires knowledge and information on both sides: the "requestor" of consent must know the procedures for obtaining consent and what storage and use of residual NBS entails, and this information must be provided to parents before they can consent and "opt-in" to residual storage and use. This model increases the exchange of important information and requires improved training of the medical professionals obtaining consent. 201 An opt-in program further ensures that parents have the opportunity to ask questions and address their concerns before deciding whether to consent to research using their newborn's residual NBS. Indeed, "the only way to be sure that someone is truly consenting . . . is to obtain his or her affirmative consent."
202
An opt-in model is particularly preferable in light of the unclear risk-benefit ratio of residual NBS research. 203 In her discussion of opt-in versus opt-out consent procedures for the initial NBS screenings, Doctor Lainie Friedman Ross posits that while opt-out procedures for high benefit-risk ratio programs may be justifiable, when the benefit-risk ratio is unclear, an opt-in procedure is preferable because it "may provide the best way to balance respect for parental autonomy and the promotion of children's health."
204 Because residual NBS research has an unclear risk-benefit ratio, it is better suited for an opt-in policy, which will promote a balance between respect for parental autonomy and public health promotion.
205
To facilitate the development of improved informed consent policies, a useful model for states to follow is a "requestor" model, which has been successfully used as part of the organ procurement process. 206 Organ procurement organizations (OPOs) have implemented requestor programs in order to increase the number of available organs. 207 The United States organ donation system operates under an "opt-in" model: the donor himself can opt to be a donor prior to death 208 or, if the deceased did not indicate his preference, the potential donor's family is given the option of donation. 209 The requestor model is a multi-disciplinary team approach to discussing and requesting organ donation from deceased individual's family members. 210 Although an organ procurement requestor's role begins at the end of life, an analogous requestor model can be used at the beginning of life to facilitate informed parental consent in procuring residual NBS for research. The circumstances in which they are asked may be different, but what is being asked of family members of the deceased or parents of a newborn is quite similar-whether they wish to donate their relative's personal biological material for the purpose of promoting the health and well-being of others.
211
Several studies support the effective use of a multidisciplinary "team" approach in obtaining consent for organ donation 212 that could be applied NBS donation. The model involves three roles which, although distinct, must collaborate for the requestor model to be successful. The three roles are (1) coordinator; (2) requestor; and (3) supporter. 213 The coordinator facilitates the collaboration of everyone involved in the process, ensuring that it is "carried out in accordance with relevant policies and protocols." 214 The requestor has the important job of empowering the parents to make decisions-he or she "is the individual who will offer the option of donation . . . or discuss donation with" the newborn's parents. 215 The supporter's job is to assist everyone in the process-the coordinator, the requestor, and the infant's parents.
216
Adequate training is essential to ensure effective and successful use of the team approach. Training is particularly important for requestors, whose role brings them into intimate contact with parents during a momentous-and often overwhelming-time in their lives and thus requires patience, understanding, and respect. A requestor could be an existing health care professional, such as a doctor, nurse, or social worker, or hospitals could hire and train a person whose sole job is to be a requestor. The model used by each hospital may differ, as larger hospitals with more births may benefit from having employees whose sole job is to request NBS donations. Some of the necessary components of a successful and respectful donation request policy include 217 : (1) understanding families in the post-childbirth stage; (2) maintaining respect for the family; (3) developing communication skills; (4) getting to know the parents; (5) assessing family dynamics and modifying approaches; (6) being sensitive to cultural, religious, and spiritual influences; 218 Organ "All," follow "Deceased Donor Transplants by State") (data last updated Oct. 11, 2013). and (7) (5) and (6) may require matching a requestor with the parents, because "people tend to respond more positively to individuals that they feel they can trust or with whom they can identify." Id. at 29. This can involve having a requestor that speaks the parents' native language, understands or practices the parents' religion, and is of the same eth-mation. Regardless of the method chosen-using an existing employee to act as a requestor or hiring an employee whose sole role is to be a requestor-all health care providers who interact with parents-both pre-natal and post-natal-should receive training and education on residual NBS policies, as there is currently a general lack of knowledge about this topic among the medical profession. 219 Storage and use of residual NBS can be a complicated topic to understand and parents may have numerous questions. Therefore, the requestor must be willing and able to spend considerable time with parents to ensure they have ample opportunity to ask questions and understand the storage process and what their child's NBS may be used for during research.
220
State policies should allow parents to change their minds and later request that their child's stored NBS be destroyed. Requestors must have adequate training in and understanding of the process of de-identification or anonymization of NBS, and states should enact policies that require anonymization, a process that strips the blood sample of all identifiers so that the sample is-as much as is scientifically possible-anonymous and nearly impossible to trace back to the particular infant. 221 
B. PRE-NATAL CARE DISCUSSIONS AND CONSENT
The ideal scenario is to begin discussions about residual NBS storage and use during pre-natal care. The requestor, along with pre-natal care providers-who should receive specific training and education on their state's newborn screening program and NBS retention policies-could introduce the idea of residual NBS research to the parent(s) at prenatal care visits. Alternatively, separate appointments could be made for the sole purpose of discussing residual NBS use to ensure the requestor has adequate time to explain the policies and proce-dures and to allow the parents to ask questions. It should be clear to parents that they have the option to refuse residual NBS retention and use. The pre-natal discussions would be ongoing and final decisions would not be made nor consent given until after the child's birth. Beginning the discussion as early as possible allows parents to think through their decisions and to ask questions. This method recognizes that informed consent should be more than a signature on a page-it should be a process during which the consenter comes to know and truly understand what it is he or she is consenting to.
C. POST-NATAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONSENT
The unfortunate reality is that not all women receive prenatal care 222 Contrary to some arguments, parental consent is possible for residual NBS research. The costs and burdens of an opt-in, consensual procedure are inadequate justifications to completely forego parental consent. In an age of impressive advancements in genomic medicine, we must be aware of potential privacy issues and draw lines early and often between legitimate and illegitimate use of our genetic information without consent. and thus pre-natal discussions will not always be possible. In such situations, after the woman has given birth and recuperated, but prior to discharge, a trained requestor should engage the parent(s) in a discussion about storage and residual use. The conversation should not occur immediately prior to discharge, as the woman is likely receiving other information at this time and may be in a hurry to get out of the hospital. In a rush to complete a mountain of discharge paperwork, the parent(s) may make hurried judgments that are not truly informed and well thought-out. All parents should be given time to think about their decision if they are unsureresidual NBS should not be disseminated for research purposes for at least one month after the infant is born. Requestors could follow-up with a phone call to discuss the parent's decision, an appointment could be made, or the issue could be re-visited at the newborn's one-month physical. Parents should not feel rushed into the decision-if they are not ready to provide consent, they should have additional time.
222. In 2010, approximately 6.2% of mothers received late (defined as third-trimester or later) or no prenatal care. CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, LATE OR NO PRENATAL CARE: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH app. 1, at 9 (2012), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ 25_Prenatal_Care.pdf.
As a society, we cannot allow administrative costs or burdens to justify infringements on individual rights, parental rights, and genetic privacy. Protections and safeguards are possible-we simply must be willing to spend the time and resources to develop and implement them.
CONCLUSION
The government's interest in and obligation to promote public health is historically, legally, and socially acknowledged. This interest cannot, however, justify non-consensual use of residual NBS. Although residual NBS research has the potential to promote public health through discovery of new diseases and treatment, such benefits have thus far been tenuous at best. A state's police power is not absolute and cannot be invoked to justify a blanket waiver of parental consent for residual NBS use. To avoid future litigation, states must address their inadequate or altogether non-existent policies governing residual NBS retention and use. These policies should include a robust informed consent procedure that will increase transparency and seek a balance between individual rights and the importance of public health research that aims to detect new conditions, develop new therapies, and eradicate diseases.
